Startup Negotiations: How Preferred Stock Makes Employee Stock Less Valuable

Originally published February 13, 2014. Updated August 30, 2023.

Attorney Mary Russell counsels individuals on startup equity, including:

You are welcome to contact her at (650) 326-3412 or at info@stockoptioncounsel.com.

Common Stock v. Preferred Stock

Startup employees and executives get Common Stock (as options, RSUs or restricted stock). When venture capitalists invest in startups, they receive Preferred Stock.

Preferred Stock comes with the right to preferential treatment in merger payouts, voting rights, and dividends. If the company / founders have caved and given venture capitalists a lot of preferred rights - like a 3X Liquidation Preference or Participating Preferred Stock , those rights will dramatically reduce the payouts to Common Stock in an acquisition. An individual who holds 1% in common stock would be curious, therefore, about the preferred stock’s rights to know if their 1% would really be 1% in an acquisition.

Is Preferred Stock Negotiable for Employees and Executives?

No. Preferred Stock is not negotiable for employees and executives (other than perhaps founders preferred stock which relates not to acquisition payout amounts but to liquidity rights and voting rights). The key is to understand if the investors’ Preferred Stock has unusual, off-market liquidation preferences. If so, that would weigh in favor of negotiating for more shares, more cash compensation or - less often but occasionally - management retention plan terms to make up for uninspiring Common Stock rights.

Liquidation Preference & How It Affects Common Stock Payouts

One Preferred Stock right is a "Liquidation Preference." Without a Liquidation Preference, each stockholder – preferred or common – would receive a percentage of the acquisition price equal to the stockholder's percentage ownership in the company. If the company were acquired for $15 million, and an employee owned 1% of the company, the employee would be paid out $150,000.

With a Liquidation Preference, preferred stockholders are guaranteed to be paid a set dollar amount of the acquisition price, even if that guaranteed payout is greater than their percentage ownership in the company.

Here’s an example of the difference. An investor buys 5 million shares of Preferred Stock for $1 per share for a total of $5 million. After the financing, there are 20 million shares of common stock and 5 million shares of Preferred Stock outstanding. The company is then acquired for $15 million.                                                                                                                           

Without a Liquidation Preference, each stockholder (common or preferred) would receive $0.60 per share. That’s $15 million / 25 million shares. A hypothetical employee who held 1% of the company or 250000 shares) would receive $150,000 (that’s 1% of $15 million).

If the preferred stockholders had a 1X Liquidation Preference and Non-Participating Preferred Stock, they would receive 1X their investment ($5 million) before any Common Stock is paid in an acquisition. They would receive the first $5 million of the acquisition price, and the remaining $10 million would be divided among the 20 million shares of common stock outstanding ($10 million / 20 million shares of common stock). Each common stockholder would be paid $0.50 per share, and hypothetical employee who held 1% of the company would receive $125,000.

In an up-round acquisition, though, this 1X non-participating preference would not affect common stock payouts. In an acquisition at $100 million valuation, the investors would choose the higher of:

  • Their $5M liquidation preference and

  • Their percentage of the company valuation. If they had 20% of the company’s shares, they would of course here choose $20M in payouts. And all common stockholders would also receive their percentage payout.

Ugly, Non-Standard Rights That Diminish Employee Stock Value

The standard Liquidation Preference is 1X. This makes sense, as the investors expect to receive their investment dollars back before employees and founders are rewarded for creating value. But some company founders give preferred stockholders multiple Liquidation Preferences or Participation Rights that cut more dramatically into employee stock payouts in an acquisition.

If preferred stockholders had a 3X Liquidation Preference, they would be paid 3X their original investment before common stock was paid out. In this example, preferred would be paid 3X their $5 million investment for a total of $15 million, and the common stockholders would receive $0. ($15 million acquisition price – $15 million Liquidation Preference = $0 paid to common stockholders)

Preferred stock may also have "Participation Rights," which would change our first example above to give preferred stockholders an even larger portion of the acquisition price.

Without Participation Rights, Preferred Stockholders must choose to either receive their Liquidation Preference or participate in the division of the full acquisition price among the all stockholders. In the first example above, the preferred stockholders held 20% of the company and had a $5 million Liquidation Preference. When the company was acquired for $15 million, the preferred stockholders had the choice to receive their $5 million liquidation preference or to participate in an equal distribution of the proceeds to all stockholders. The equal distribution would have given them $3 million (20% of $15 million acquisition price), so they chose to take their $5 million liquidation preference, and the remaining $10 million was divided among 20 million shares of common stock.

If the Preferred Stock also had Participation Rights, (which is called Participating Preferred Stock), they would receive their Liquidation Preference and participate in the distribution of the remaining proceeds.

In our example with a 1X Liquidation Preference but adding a Participation Right, the Participating Preferred Stock would receive their $5 million Liquidation Preference AND a portion of the remaining $10 million of the acquisition price equal to their % ownership in the company.

$5 million Liquidation Preference + ((5 million shares / 25 million shares outstanding) * $10 million) = $7 million

Common stockholders would receive (20 million shares common stock / 25 million shares outstanding) * $10 million = $8 million.

Our hypothetical employee who held 1% of the company would receive $100,000 (.01 * $10 million) or 0.67% of the acquisition price.

Employee Focus – Quick and Dirty Analysis

These calculations are complicated, so most candidates who are evaluating a startup job offer keep it simple in considering the effects of preferred stock. The quick and dirty way to know if preferred stock is an issue in evaluating an equity offer is to find out:

Do preferred stock investors have any liquidation preferences beyond the standard 1X non-participating preference?

If not, it’s not an issue in any up-round acquisition (and so most startup hires would not be concerned about the preferences at hire).

Founder Focus – Negotiating Your Acquisition Payout

If you are a founder and are negotiating with an acquiror, consider renegotiating your investors’ Liquidation Preference payout. Everything is negotiable in an acquisition, including the division of the acquisition price among founders, investors and employees. Do not get pushed around by your investors here, as their rights in the documents do not have to determine their payout.

If your investors are pushing to receive the full Liquidation Preference and leaving you and/or your employees with a small cut of the payout, address this with your investment bankers. They may be able to help you play your acquiror against the investors so that you are not cut out of the wealth of the deal, as most acquirors want the founders and employees to receive enough of the acquisition price to inspire them to stay with the company after acquisition.

Attorney Mary Russell counsels individuals on startup equity, including:

You are welcome to contact her at (650) 326-3412 or at info@stockoptioncounsel.com.

Thanks to investment banker Michael Barker for his comments on founder merger negotiations. Michael is a Managing Director at Shea & Company, LLC,  a technology-focused investment bank and leading strategic advisor to the software industry.

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Double Trigger Acceleration and Other Change of Control Terms for Startup Stock, Options and RSUs

Startup Equity | Double Trigger Acceleration | Change of Control Terms for Startup Stock, Options and RSUs

What does double trigger acceleration mean? It protects unvested shares from cancellation in a change of control by immediately accelerating those shares if the individual is terminated as part of the change of control. Founders, executives and key hires, including employee-level hires at early stage startups, negotiate for Double Trigger Acceleration in their equity grant documents at the offer letter stage.

Attorney Mary Russell counsels individuals on startup equity, including:

You are welcome to contact her at (650) 326-3412 or at info@stockoptioncounsel.com.

Originally published June 5, 2018. Updated July 27, 2023.

Change of Control Terms for Startup Stock, Options and RSUs

Startup stock, options and RSUs vest over time. Since they vest over time, some may not be vested when the company has a change of control (aka merger or acquisition). What happens to the unvested shares at change of control? It depends on the fine print in your equity documents.

Founders, executives and key hires, including employee-level hires at early stage startups, often negotiate for Double Trigger Acceleration to protect their unvested shares. Advisors and some founders and rare executives may negotiate for Single Trigger Acceleration so that their shares immediately vest at acquisition. However, these protections are not often negotiable for employee-level hires except at very early stage companies. Their equity will be governed by the general terms of the Plan, which will likely be either an unfavorable Cancellation Plan.

Single Trigger Acceleration

The ideal change of control acceleration term is Single Trigger Acceleration - so that 100% of unvested shares vest immediately upon change of control. Investors and companies often argue against this term because the company may be an unappealing acquisition target if its key talent will not be incentivized to stay after closing. This is especially true for technical talent at a technology company.

Advisors, some founders and rare executives may negotiate for Single Trigger Acceleration if they can make the case that their role will not be needed after change of control. For example, advisors naturally negotiate for Single Trigger Acceleration because their primary role is to advise a company at the startup stage. They would not be necessary after an acquisition as they’ve fulfilled their purpose by that time. Founders and executives sometimes argue for Single Trigger Acceleration based on aligning incentives. For example, I’ve worked with a CFO who negotiated for 50% Single Trigger Acceleration because he was hired with the express purpose of improving the company’s financial position to achieve an acquisition. Those with similar arguments may even negotiate for Single Trigger Acceleration to apply at IPO, which would be a very unusual term but a logical incentive for certain hires.

Double Trigger Acceleration

The next best term is Double Trigger Acceleration, in which unvested equity immediately vests if both of two triggers are met. First, the company closes a change of control. Second, the individual’s service is terminated for certain reasons (most often a terminated by the company without Cause or a voluntary resignation by the individual for Good Reason).

Founders, executives and key hires, including employee-level hires at early stage startups, negotiate for Double Trigger Acceleration in their equity grant documents at the offer letter stage.

The key argument for Double Trigger Acceleration is based on risk. If an individual at any level of the organization is taking a significant risk to join the company, such as sacrificing significant cash or other compensation elsewhere to join, they advocate for Double Trigger Acceleration to protect their upside in the event that the equity becomes valuable. A grant of 1% with Double Trigger Acceleration is more valuable because of that protection of the upside. A second key argument for this term is based on “aligning incentives.” If individuals on the team could lose valuable unvested equity by achieving a prompt acquisition, their incentives would not be aligned with the company’s goals of closing that deal. Double Trigger Acceleration rights bring the individuals' incentives in alignment with the company's goals.

This Double Trigger Acceleration protection is negotiated at the offer letter stage and included in the final equity grant documents.  The key negotiable terms in this clause are:

  1. Full acceleration so that a qualifying termination at any time after acquisition accelerates 100% of unvested shares;

  2. Application to a qualifying termination in anticipation of, or for a certain protective period of time prior to, change of control;

  3. Application to terminated by the company for Cause (narrowly defined, not to include arguable performance terms);

  4. Application to a resignation by the individual for Good Reason (defined broadly to include a change in cash compensation, a reduction in duties or reporting structure, a geographic change, and anything else that would amount to constructive termination for the individual);

  5. A broad definition of change of control including a sale of substantially all the company’s assets;

  6. Immediate vesting at closing of the change of control if unvested shares would otherwise be cancelled without payment under a Cancellation Plan term. More on this here from Cooley:

Often overlooked, however, is that in order for double-trigger acceleration to be meaningful, the option grant or equity award must actually be assumed or continued by the acquiror in the transaction. This will not always be the case in a transaction – aquirors often have their own plans and ideas for incentivizing their employees. If an unvested option or equity award terminates in connection with a transaction, then technically, there will be no unvested options or awards to accelerate if the second trigger (i.e., the qualifying termination) occurs after the transaction.

Continuation Plan

If the startup’s Equity Incentive Plan includes a continuation term, the value of the unvested shares continue to vest after change of control so long as the individual stays in service after the closing. We’ll call this style of plan a Continuation Plan. The unvested shares are likely to be converted into another form, such as RSUs in the acquiring company or cash deal consideration. But the value is protected so that the deal value per share paid to vested shares at closing will be paid to these unvested shares on each subsequent vesting date. If the individual is terminated or resigns for any reason, they would not be paid out. If the deal does not provide for such continuation or substitution, unvested equity will be accelerated so that it becomes 100% vested and paid at closing.

If an employee's total number of shares was worth $200,000 at the acquisition price, and only 50% had vested at the acquisition, the employee would be paid $100,000 at closing. But the unvested shares would be replaced with a substitution or continuation award in exchange for the $100,000 in unvested value. That might be in the form of cash to vest over time, continuing awards in the original company, or new equity in the acquiring company's equity. Whatever the form, it would continue to vest over the remaining portion of the original vesting schedule.

Without the Double or Single Trigger Acceleration protections described below, the individual could be terminated for any reason, at any time, and would lose the unvested shares.  However, those who stay at the acquiring company under a Continuation Plan will continue to earn the deal consideration for their unvested shares. (But beware. Those with unvested equity under a Continuation Plan may also be asked to sign new employment agreements forfeiting these rights as part of the acquisition, since the company’s leverage of termination is significant).

Cancellation Plan

Most startup Equity Incentive Plans allow the company to cancel unvested shares without payment in an acquisition. We’ll call this type of plan a Cancellation Plan. Under a Cancellation Plan, unvested equity can be cancelled and replaced with $0, even if the unvested shares had significant value at the time of the acquisition. For example, if an employee's total number of shares was worth $200,000 at the acquisition price, and only 50% had vested at the acquisition, the employee would be paid $100,000 at closing. The unvested value of $100,000 could be cancelled without payment even if the employee stayed on as an employee after the acquisition. In another example, if the employee was within the first year of service and had a one-year cliff vesting schedule, 100% of the grant could be cancelled without payment even if it was immensely valuable based on the deal price/share.

The distinction between a Cancellation Plan and the more protective Continuation Plan is not usually a negotiable term. The exception to this would be at a startup with employee-friendly founders and executives who are willing to advocate for changes to their Plan with the board and stockholders. When startup candidates encounter this term in their offer negotiation document review, their best course of action is likely to be to negotiate for Single Trigger Acceleration or Double Trigger Acceleration for their individual grants.

Negotiating Change of Control Terms

The availability of Single Trigger Protection or Double Trigger Protection and/or the distinction between a Cancellation Plan and a Continuation Plan is a factor in assessing the risk of joining a startup. If the fine print protects 100% of the unvested shares, the shares have a higher potential upside for the employee or executive. Without these protections, it may make sense to negotiate for a higher cash package or a higher number of shares to balance risk. Check out more on my blog about market data for startup equity offers and other key terms that affect the risk of startup equity including clawbacks and tax planning for stock options.


Attorney Mary Russell counsels individuals on startup equity, including:

You are welcome to contact her at (650) 326-3412 or at info@stockoptioncounsel.com.

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Company-Side Education Programs on Startup Equity - Feedback from Newsletter Subscribers

Here’s a quick primer on how to negotiate stock options or RSUs in a startup. It's up to individuals to educate and empower themselves when company-side education programs are lacking.

Here’s a quick primer on how to negotiate stock options or RSUs in a startup. It's up to individuals to educate and empower themselves when company-side education programs are lacking. Photo by Alena Darmel.

Attorney Mary Russell counsels individuals on startup equity, including:

You are welcome to contact her at (650) 326-3412 or at info@stockoptioncounsel.com.

I asked my newsletter subscribers to share their experiences with startup company employee equity education programs. Thank you for all your responses! I love being in touch and hearing your feedback. 

See below under My Takeaways for a quick primer on how employees can empower themselves by taking the initiative to learn about startup equity and ask their companies for the information they need to make informed decisions. 

Individuals reported these company programs they found very helpful:

  • Company all-hands meetings followed by both (1) smaller working groups led by the CEO/CFO using real world tangible scenarios to explain and provide context and (2) one-on-ones with senior management.

  • Training sessions with the company’s CFO.

  • Carta, including blog content, presentations, Equity 101 posts, and online calculators. “Very good interface with clear information.”

Individuals reported these company programs they found somewhat helpful:

  • Company-wide information meeting on stock options, but not provided until years after the  employee joined the company. 

  • Carta as stock administrator. This allows employees to “have more access and run the calculator more frequently. But it doesn’t speak to the non-price issues like post-termination exercise periods, forced share repurchase,” etc. Also, “Carta maximizes for startup friendliness, and here employee friendliness runs counter to that goal.” 

  • ShareWorks as stock administrator. The “account includes the value of your options based on the latest valuation. From a user experience, [though,] it is clunky like most financial software products.”

Individuals reported these company programs they found not helpful or harmful:

  • Company education program on stock option exercise by a stock broker who was “in it for himself and not the employees. … The education they were offering was to inform the newly wealthy employees how to “invest” their new found cash. It is not a good strategy to use someone like that for that purpose … I lost about $1M of the money I earned from the startup. It was disastrous. If companies host an individual, make sure they are fiduciaries and not brokers.”

  • Company-wide information meeting with general information and many disclaimers, which was “not that helpful for making actionable decisions. … I think the presentations backfired because most either didn’t understand options any better than they did prior to the meeting and those that did realized their options weren’t that valuable (which was the opposite motivation of the CEO).”

  • In a geographic area where “most employees aren’t stock option aware …, although we granted stock options to all employees, most ignored them because they were difficult to understand. And HR was unable to answer any questions about options because they didn’t understand them. … In the case of recruiting and offers -- the lore was more important than the facts.”

  • Recruiters who “fail to disclose the material issues, and sometimes state that the equity situation is more favorable than it actually is.”

Individuals reported these wish-list items they had not yet seen:

  • “If this were my project, I would use a framework of virtual recorded introductory education sessions that give the basics of the compensation program, and a one-on-one follow up to cover any lingering questions.  I would build out a self-help knowledge base that covers common lingering questions and/or use that info to improve the education sessions.”

  • “I like the idea of a 3rd party to provide the trainings, mixed with key staff or founder interaction to build trust.”

  • Examples, simplicity, transparency and opportunities for lots of Q&A in small groups. A library of content that addresses common questions, concerns and misconceptions would also be very valuable. 

  • “It would be great if our law firm had established programs to walk us through the process.”

  • “What employees really want to know is -- what is the value of my options under various realistic scenarios. One approach might be several if-then scenarios and then employees can decide which one of those hypothetical scenarios most applies to them.”

  • “Options seem to be presented as a commodity component to most offerings with a presumed windfall. … It’s important to manage expectations of what the value is and how to think about that; how to act, when, why.”

  • An educational program would need to provide an  “overview, some tools for employees to calculate future sums/ exit projections (dream a bit), and cover common tax issues, maybe an overview of company/venture process (what the near future could mean for equity holders), and gotchas like: what happens to my vested equity if I have to leave the company.”

Services providers reported these as service offerings they had available to companies:

Note: If you are a service provider in this area with an offering I have not included, please send me an email with a description of your services so I can add it to the list.

  • Dan Walter, FutureSense. Dan advises companies on executive pay, equity compensation, incentive compensation, and pay for performance. He says that employee education “is a normal piece of our deliverables for nearly every company we work with.” I’ve seen him speak on these topics and he has, as promised, “a unique ability to help anyone understand even the most complex and technical details in ways that are approachable and memorable.”

  • Bruce Brumberg, myStockOptions.com. Bruce’s site, myStockOptions.com, is the “premier source of web-based educational content and tools on stock compensation for plan participants, financial advisors, companies, and stock plan providers.” They license their educational resources to companies for their programs.  

  • Tom Bondi, CPA, Armanino, LLP. Tom offers company-side employee stock/equity training programs to companies with from 25-500 employees, where the companies wish to give back to their employees with knowledge they are not able to offer.

  • Financial Advisors who are available to companies in the run-up to an IPO or acquisition to educate the company’s employees. 

  • Carta’s Tax Advisory. Updated February 2023: This add-on to Carta’s cap table service allows startups to help their employees make tax decisions around their equity. Employees of subscribing companies have access to one-on-ones with tax advisors such as: Ask a Quick Question (15 minutes), Understand Equity Tax Basics (30 minutes), Create Tax Scenarios (45 minutes) and Discuss Tender Offer Participation (30 minutes).

My takeaways:

Some company-side education programs are helpful to employees in navigating their equity.  However, it is up to individual employees to empower themselves by taking the initiative to learn about startup equity and ask their companies for the information they need to make informed decisions. 

Here’s a quick primer on how individuals can do this (based on this blog post):

  • Number of Shares. The offer letter may include the number of shares, but this number is certainly not all you need to evaluate and negotiate the offer. I encourage candidates to ask questions about the equity package and number of shares until they have the information they need to make an informed decision. More on evaluating the number of shares in an offer letter here.

  • Equity Grant Form Documents. The equity incentive plan and form stock option agreement contain important details about the equity grant, so it makes sense to request and review them before signing the offer letter. These agreements may give the company clawback rights for vested shares or other terms that may dramatically limit the value of the equity offer. If these red flags appear in the form documents, it makes sense to negotiate to remove them from your individual grant or add additional compensation to make up for that loss in value.

  • Tax Structure. The right tax structure for an option or RSU offer will balance your interests in total value, low tax rates, tax deferral and investment deferral. This balance is different for each individual and at each company stage. You will want to have a tax strategy in mind before accepting the offer letter, so you can negotiate any necessary terms to enable that strategy as part of the offer letter itself.

Attorney Mary Russell counsels individuals on startup equity, including:

You are welcome to contact her at (650) 326-3412 or at info@stockoptioncounsel.com.

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