Startup Equity - Ownership - Can the Company Take Back My Vested Shares?

This is a companion piece to the Gold Standard of Startup Equity - A Guide for Employees. It describes why startup employees should ask about Standard #1: Ownership: Can the Company Take Back My Vested Shares?

Image republished with permission of Babak Nivi of Venture Hacks, who warns startup employees to "run screaming from" any startup equity offer that gives the company the right to repurchase vested stock: "Some option plans provide the company the right to repurchase your vested stock upon your departure. The purchase price is 'fair market value.' Guess whether the definition of fair market value is favorable to you or the company... Founders and employees should not agree to this provision under any circumstances. Read your option plan carefully."

Image republished with permission of Babak Nivi of Venture Hacks, who warns startup employees to "run screaming from" any startup equity offer that gives the company the right to repurchase vested stock: "Some option plans provide the company the right to repurchase your vested stock upon your departure. The purchase price is 'fair market value.' Guess whether the definition of fair market value is favorable to you or the company... Founders and employees should not agree to this provision under any circumstances. Read your option plan carefully."

The news loves a gold rush story about a Google chef or a Facebook muralist who made millions on startup employee equity. But not all startup equity is created equal. If a startup adds "repurchase rights for vested shares" to its employee stock agreements, its employees have to keep their jobs all the way until an IPO or acquisition in order to get the full value of their shares.  If you're working at a tech startup with a gold rush dream, make sure you avoid the dreaded:

Repurchase rights for vested shares are "horrible for employees" - YC's Sam Altman

In a true startup equity plan, employees earn shares of common stock which they continue to own when they leave the company. Just as they would own shares of public company stock they bought through a broker, they own their startup stock until they are paid for the shares when they company is acquired or they are able to sell them on the public markets after an IPO. There are special rules about vesting and requirements for exercising options, but once the shares are vested and purchased, the employees of true startups have true ownership rights.

But some startups design their equity plans so that employees earn shares that they don't really own. If the company includes repurchase rights for vested shares, the company can purchase the employees' shares upon certain events, most commonly after an employee leaves the company or is terminated by the company. Most repurchase rights expire after an IPO or acquisition so that if the employee is still there at the IPO or acquisition they get the full value of the shares. If not, the company can buy back the shares at a discounted price, called the "fair market value" of the common stock on the date of the buyback ("FMV").

These repurchase rights are included in stock option plans, stock option agreements or company bylaws, but most employees do not know about these value-limiting terms when they join a company or even when they choose to exercise their stock options. That's why the Gold Standard of Startup Equity - A Guide for Employees - suggests that employees ask before they accept startup equity: Can the Company take back my vested shares?

How Repurchase Rights Take away Employee Equity Value

One might think that an employee might be happy to sell their shares to the company. But repurchase rights are not designed with the employee's interests in mind. They allow the company to buy the shares back against the employees will and at a discounted price per share. As Y Combinator head Sam Altman wrote, "Some companies now write in a repurchase right on vested shares at the current common price when an employee leaves.  It’s fine if the company wants to offer to repurchase the shares, but it’s horrible for the company to be able to demand this."

The  common price at the date of repurchase is not the true value for two reasons. First, the true value of common stock is close to the preferred stock price per share (the price that is paid by investors for stock and which is used to define the value of the startup). Second, the real value of owning startup stock comes at the exit event - IPO or acquisition. This early buyback prevents the employee realizing that value.

Example - Company Does NOT Have Repurchase Rights for Vested Shares - Employee Value: $1.7 Million

Here's an example of how an employee in a true startup earns the value of startup stock. The company cannot buy his or her shares at departure, so he or she holds them until IPO. In the case of an early employee of Ruckus Wireless, Inc., the value would have grown as shown below.

This is an example of a hypothetical early employee of Ruckus Wireless, which went public in 2012. It assumes that the company did not offer equity with the "horrible" repurchase rights for vested shares. Therefore, the employee was able to hold his or her shares until IPO and earn $1.7 million. These calculations were estimated from company public filings with the State of California, the State of Delaware, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. For more on these calculations, see The One Percent: How 1% of Ruckus Wireless at Series A Became $1.7 million at IPO. 

This is an example of a hypothetical early employee of Ruckus Wireless, which went public in 2012. It assumes that the company did not offer equity with the "horrible" repurchase rights for vested shares. Therefore, the employee was able to hold his or her shares until IPO and earn $1.7 million. These calculations were estimated from company public filings with the State of California, the State of Delaware, and the Securities and Exchange Commission. For more on these calculations, see The One Percent: How 1% of Ruckus Wireless at Series A Became $1.7 million at IPO. 

If you want to see the working calculations, visit the document on GoogleDocs.

Example - Company DOES Have Repurchase Rights for Vested Shares - Employee Value: $68,916

If the company had the right to repurchase the shares at the fair market value of the common stock at the employee's departure, and the employee left after four years of service when his shares were fully vested, the buyout price would have been $68,916 (estimated). This would have taken away a value of $1,635,054 by the time of the IPO:

Hypothetical - If the company could have repurchased the vested shares at departure, the employee would have lost $1,635,054 in value. When you are evaluating an equity offer, always ask: Can the company take back my vested shares? For more, see Gold Standard of Startup Equity - A Guide for EmployeesIf you want to see the working calculations, visit the document on GoogleDocs.

If you want to see the working calculations, visit the document on GoogleDocs.

Here's the point:

When you are evaluating your startup equity, find out if the company has the right to repurchase your vested shares. If they can do so, you don't really own them. That changes their value significantly. If you have the power to negotiate this term out of your documents, do so. If not, incorporate this value-limiting term into your evaluation of your equity. Not all equity is created equal. 

For more, see Stock Option Counsel's Gold Standard of Startup Equity - A Guide for Employees. If you would like professional guidance in evaluating your startup equity,  contact Stock Option Counsel - Legal Services for Individuals.

Attorney Mary Russell counsels individual employees and founders to negotiate, maximize and monetize their stock options and other startup stock. She is available through Stock Option Counsel to guide individual employees and founders in negotiating and evaluating startup equity, negotiating post-acquisition employment agreements, making stock option exercise and tax decisions and selling startup stock.

Startup Negotiations: How Preferred Stock Makes Employee Stock Less Valuable

Mary Russell counsels individual employees and founders to negotiate, maximize and monetize their stock options and other startup stock. She is an attorney and the founder of Stock Option Counsel.

If you have a job offer from a startup with an option to purchase shares representing 1% of the company, you may want to consider the Preferred Stock "Liquidation Preference" to see if your 1% would really be 1% if the company is acquired. If the Liquidation Preference is high, you might want to negotiate for more shares to make up for the loss in value you can expect when the company is acquired.

Common Stock v. Preferred Stock

As a startup employee, you'll be getting Common Stock (as options, RSUs or restricted stock). When venture capitalists invest in startups, they receive Preferred Stock. Preferred Stock comes with the right to preferential treatment in merger payouts, voting rights, and dividends. If the company / founders have caved and given venture capitalists a lot of preferred rights - like a 3X Liquidation Preference or Participating Preferred Stock , those rights will dramatically reduce your payouts in an acquisition.

Liquidation Preference & How It Makes Employee Stock Less Valuable

One Preferred Stock right is a "Liquidation Preference." Without a Liquidation Preference, each stockholder – preferred or common – would receive a percentage of the acquisition price equal to the stockholder's percentage ownership in the company. If the company were acquired for $15 million, and an employee owned 1% of the company, the employee would be paid out $150,000.

With a Liquidation Preference, preferred stockholders are guaranteed to be paid a set dollar amount of the acquisition price, even if that guaranteed payout is greater than their percentage ownership in the company.

Here’s an example of the difference. An investor buys 5 million shares of Preferred Stock for $1 per share for a total of $5 million. After the financing, there are 20 million shares of common stock and 5 million shares of Preferred Stock outstanding. The company is then acquired for $15 million.                                                                                                                           

Without a Liquidation Preference, each stockholder (common or preferred) would receive $0.60 per share. That’s $15 million / 25 million shares. A hypothetical employee who held 1% of the company or 250000 shares) would receive $150,000 (that’s 1% of $15 million).

If the preferred stockholders had a 1X Liquidation Preference and Non-Participating Preferred Stock, they would receive 1X their investment ($5 million) before any Common Stock is paid in an acquisition. They would receive the first $5 million of the acquisition price, and the remaining $10 million would be divided among the 20 million shares of common stock outstanding ($10 million / 20 million shares of common stock). Each common stockholder would be paid $0.50 per share, and hypothetical employee who held 1% of the company would receive $125,000.

Ugly, Non-Standard Rights That Diminish Employee Stock Value

The standard Liquidation Preference is 1X. This makes sense, as the investors expect to receive their investment dollars back before employees and founders are rewarded for creating value. But some company founders give preferred stockholders multiple Liquidation Preferences or Participation Rights that cut more dramatically into employee stock payouts in an acquisition.

If preferred stockholders had a 3X Liquidation Preference, they would be paid 3X their original investment before common stock was paid out. In this example, preferred would be paid 3X their $5 million investment for a total of $15 million, and the common stockholders would receive $0. ($15 million acquisition price – $15 million Liquidation Preference = $0 paid to common stockholders)

Preferred stock may also have "Participation Rights," which would change our first example above to give preferred stockholders an even larger portion of the acquisition price.

Without Participation Rights, Preferred Stockholders must choose to either receive their Liquidation Preference or participate in the division of the full acquisition price among the all stockholders. In the first example above, the preferred stockholders held 20% of the company and had a $5 million Liquidation Preference. When the company was acquired for $15 million, the preferred stockholders had the choice to receive their $5 million liquidation preference or to participate in an equal distribution of the proceeds to all stockholders. The equal distribution would have given them $3 million (20% of $15 million acquisition price), so they chose to take their $5 million liquidation preference, and the remaining $10 million was divided among 20 million shares of common stock.

If the Preferred Stock also had Participation Rights, (which is called Participating Preferred Stock), they would receive their Liquidation Preference and participate in the distribution of the remaining proceeds.

In our example with a 1X Liquidation Preference but adding a Participation Right, the Participating Preferred Stock would receive their $5 million Liquidation Preference AND a portion of the remaining $10 million of the acquisition price equal to their % ownership in the company.

$5 million Liquidation Preference + ((5 million shares / 25 million shares outstanding) * $10 million) = $7 million

Common stockholders would receive (20 million shares common stock / 25 million shares outstanding) * $10 million = $8 million.

Our hypothetical employee who held 1% of the company would receive $100,000 (.01 * $10 million) or 0.67% of the acquisition price.

Employee Focus – Calculating Your Payout

If you are an employee of a startup, you can use Liquidation Preference as shorthand for the minimum price the company would have to be acquired for before any employees would be paid out. 

If the acquisition price is less than the Liquidation Preference, common stockholders will get $0 in the acquisition.

If you want to go further and understand what you would be paid out if the acquisition price is more than the Liquidation Preference, consider these three scenarios:

If the preferred stockholders have Participating Preferred Stock, Your Payout = (Acquisition Price – Liquidation Preference) * Your % of All Outstanding Stock

If the preferred stockholders have Non-Participating Preferred Stock, you will receive the lower of:

Your Payout = (Acquisition Price – Liquidation Preference) * Your % of Common Stock OR

Your Payout = Acquisition Price * Your % Ownership

Employee Focus – What to Ask the Company

These calculations are complicated, so if you are evaluating a job offer you might want to stay out of these details leave it up to the company to tell you how the Liquidation Preference would affect you in an acquisition. Use these questions to understand how the Liquidation Preference would reduce the value of your common stock in an acquisition. Simply ask the CFO these questions:

1. What is the total Liquidation Preference? Do the investors have Participation Rights?

2. If the company were purchased today at the most recent VC valuation, what would my shares be worth?

3. If the company were purchased today at 2X the most recent VC valuation, what would my shares be worth? 

3. If the company were purchased today at 10X the most recent VC valuation, what would my shares be worth?

This will give you a good feel for how heavy the VC Liquidation Preferences are and how they would weigh down the growth in value of the common stock.

Founder Focus – Negotiating Your Acquisition Payout

If you are a founder and are negotiating with an acquiror, consider renegotiating your investors’ Liquidation Preference payout. Everything is negotiable in an acquisition, including the division of the acquisition price among founders, investors and employees. Do not get pushed around by your investors here, as their rights in the documents do not have to determine their payout.

If your investors are pushing to receive the full Liquidation Preference and leaving you and/or your employees with a small cut of the payout, address this with your investment bankers. They may be able to help you play your acquiror against the investors so that you are not cut out of the wealth of the deal, as most acquirors want the founders and employees to receive enough of the acquisition price to inspire them to stay with the company after acquisition.

Mary Russell is an attorney and the founder of Stock Option Counsel. You are invited to contact Stock Option Counsel for help in negotiating and evaluating your job offers and post-acquisition employment agreements, making stock option exercise and tax decisions and identifying your rights and opportunities to sell startup stock. 

Thanks to investment banker Michael Barker for his comments on founder merger negotiations. Michael is a Managing Director at Shea & Company, LLC,  a technology-focused investment bank and leading strategic advisor to the software industry.

VIDEO Startup Stock Options: Exercise Price Basics

Stock Option Counsel for individual employees and founders in all matters relating to startup stock options or other employee stock. This video describes stock options in a simple, accessible way. Call us when you want to evaluate, maximize or monetize your stock options or other startup stock. (650) 326-3412. www.stockoptioncounsel.com. info@stockoptioncounsel.com.

Negotiation Rhythms #2: Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement

Mary Russell counsels individual employees and founders to negotiate, maximize and monetize their stock options and other startup stock. She is an attorney and the founder of Stock Option Counsel. You are welcome to contact Stock Option Counsel at info@stockoptioncounsel or (650) 326-3412.

We know we want to push beyond our limits to capture as much value as possible in a negotiation. But how do we define those limits? It takes a five-word phrase to bring this concept into focus: Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement (“BATNA”).

The BATNA for a car buyer might be the same car at a nearby dealership for $20,000. The BATNA for a home seller might be an offer from another party for $1 million. The BATNA for a child trading baseball cards might be to hold onto his favorite cards and enjoy looking at them rather than to trade them away.

 

BATNA Slide.jpg

Any agreement below (or, for a maximum limit, above) a BATNA would leave the negotiator worse off than in the absence of that particular agreement. Said another way, the negotiator would be better off with some other option – their BATNA – than accepting an agreement on those terms.

 

BATNAexamples.jpg

To properly identify a BATNA, we must do a lot of calculating, daydreaming, and going out in the world to test alternatives. But this creative process is necessary. When we believe that the only alternative is the one at hand, our negotiation position is dangerously weak. It is also dangerously ineffective because it leads to an arrangement that does not, in fact, make the negotiator better off than without it. And any deal that is not in both parties’ best interests is unstable and likely to collapse after it is made.

Countless factors go into naming and ranking one’s alternatives to arrive at a BATNA, and even then it is impossible to do so clearly as those factors cannot all be outlined in numerical format. A better offer might be less certain of being completed, so it might be more advantageous to make an agreement on less favorable terms today. For example, the other job offer might not be certain even though it appears it would be more advantageous if it were finalized. This is the old saying that a bird in the hand is better than two in the bush, and this can be dangerous for those who optimistically negotiate as if their imaginary alternatives are already in the hand. In the other extreme, this is very limiting for those who are very fearful of uncertainty, as they will accept disadvantageous terms for the simple purpose of having certain terms when a bit of risk in pursuit of a better alternative could have led to greater results.

Timing is important in other ways as well, as a negotiator with more time to come to an agreement will have more chances to find alternatives to the agreement at hand. "Wait and see" becomes a BATNA in itself. The opposite of this would be a party who must have resolution today, which would, of course, limit the alternatives.

Beyond hard limits on time, some people do not enjoy the back and forth process of negotiating. They might prefer to take this deal, and even to accept much less of the middle than is possible to capture, than to continue to seek alternatives or negotiate deals. For these people, the process itself inhibits the growth of BATNAs.

We’ll see in the next post – Negotiation Rhythms #3: Sales & Threats – how brainstorming or eliminating BATNAs changes the ZOPA and improves or weakens our force in negotiation.

Mary Russell counsels individual employees and founders to negotiate, maximize and monetize their stock options and other startup stock. She is an attorney and the founder of Stock Option Counsel. You are welcome to contact Stock Option Counsel at info@stockoptioncounsel or (650) 326-3412.

Startup Negotiation: Know the Game

Mary Russell counsels individual employees and founders to negotiate, maximize and monetize their stock options and other startup stock. She is an attorney and the founder of Stock Option Counsel.

Craps is the best game in a casino. The house odds are very low at around 0.6%. When you’re rolling and you’re hot you can make big money for everyone at the table. And when you’re cold it doesn’t take long for your turn to end and the dice to move to someone who might get hot!

The same is true for Silicon Valley. It is arguably the only place where employees can strike it rich. Employees become rollers here, making the enterprise happen and enjoying some of the upside of the business through employee equity.

But the odds in craps can be even worse than double zero roulette if you don’t choose the right bets. There are about 120 to choose from, and the people who win know the game and know the risks they’re taking with each bet.

This is a list of casino-style descriptions of a bet on stock options, RSUs or ESPPs. We’ll give each a more thorough look (and pay attention to the great casino king Uncle Sam’s take) in later posts. To keep it simple, these presume that the vesting time/terms have been met by the player.

Stock Options: Player wins cash if (1) player pays cash exercise price to company before/when leaving the company and before the expiration date of the option; (2) company gives permission for or requires player to sell shares (on secondary market, at IPO, at sale of company, etc.); and (3) player sells shares at a price greater than the exercise price. Player loses the exercise price cash if (2) and (3) are not met.

RSUs (“Restricted Stock Units”): Player wins cash when (1) company settles the RSUs in shares of common stock (aka company gives player common stock) and (2) player sells the shares.

ESPPs (“Employee Stock Purchase Plans”): Player wins cash if (1) player makes cash payroll contribution; (2) company converts player’s cash to shares on purchase date (# of shares = cash/conversion price); (3) player sells shares at a price greater than the conversion price. Player loses cash if player sells shares below the conversion price.

Of course, this post does not include the 1000 disclaimers that would be necessary to cover every possible Stock Option/RSU/ESPP plan or equity compensation bet. But it should be a good place to start for employees trying to know the game.